Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Joint Civil Sections, July 26, 2026, Judgment No. 24045 (Sectional No. 125/2026)

On 26 July 2026, the Sezioni Unite of the Italian Corte di Cassazione delivered Judgment No. 24045, a decision destined to become one of the most important precedents in the recent history of Italian citizenship law.

We are confronted with a genuine Landmark Ruling that redefines the interpretation of ius sanguinis and reaffirms fundamental principles of the Italian legal system that appeared to have been weakened following the enactment of the so-called Tajani Law.

Although, formally, the judgment resolves litigation concerning the recognition of Italian citizenship for minor children of Italian citizens born abroad, known in legal circles as the "Minor Issue" because it primarily affects descendants born in ius soli countries such as the United States, its significance extends far beyond that issue.

The legal question appeared straightforward, yet it carried enormous practical significance: can a child who was born already holding dual citizenship—Italian by ius sanguinis and foreign by ius soli—automatically lose Italian citizenship as a consequence of the subsequent naturalisation of his or her father or mother?

That was precisely the legal question that the Sezioni Unite were called upon to resolve.

The answer given by the Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione is unequivocal: no.

And that answer may have consequences extending even to the debate concerning the constitutionality of the Tajani Law itself.

The Definitive End of a Controversial Interpretation

For several years, judicial decisions began to emerge that interpreted Articles 7 and 12 of Law No. 555 of 1912 together, maintaining that the naturalisation of a parent could interrupt the transmission of Italian citizenship even with respect to children who had already been born Italian by ius sanguinis and citizens of another State by ius soli.

The Sezioni Unite now categorically reject that legal construction.

As the judgment expressly states:

"Non è possibile ricorrere a una disciplina, quella dell'articolo 12, per risolvere situazioni regolate dall'altra, quella dell'articolo 7."

In other words, it is not legally possible to rely upon Article 12 to resolve situations governed by Article 7, because the two provisions regulate entirely different legal situations and pursue different purposes.

Citizenship Acquired at Birth Does Not Automatically Disappear

The judgment recalls one of the historical principles of Italian citizenship law: whoever acquires citizenship by birth acquires it originally, and that status does not automatically disappear as a consequence of subsequent events beyond the individual's control.

The Sezioni Unite recall that anyone seeking judicial recognition of citizenship is required to prove only:

• the original fact giving rise to acquisition;
• the line of transmission of citizenship.

The burden instead falls upon the State to establish the existence of a legally valid interrupting event.

This allocation of the burden of proof once again places the recognition of citizenship within the sphere of the individual's fundamental rights.

Loss of Citizenship Always Requires a Voluntary and Express Decision

One of the most important passages of the judgment reaffirms a principle that the Court had already developed in earlier case law: Italian citizenship cannot be lost through circumstances beyond the individual's own will.

The Sezioni Unite expressly recall that:

"...the right may be lost by renunciation, but only where such renunciation is voluntary and express, never through implied renunciation."

This principle becomes even more significant when the judgment examines the situation of a child born simultaneously with Italian citizenship (ius sanguinis) and another citizenship acquired by ius soli.

The Court states:

"La posizione del bipolide di diritto... è regolata in modo autonomo ed assorbente dall'art. 7 e si caratterizza per il fatto che la perdita della cittadinanza italiana necessita di una scelta volontaria e consapevole."

Translated:

The legal position of a person possessing dual citizenship by origin is governed exclusively by Article 7, and the loss of Italian citizenship always requires a voluntary and conscious choice on the part of the citizen.

Full Recognition of Equality Between Father and Mother

Judgment No. 24045 also reaffirms another principle of extraordinary importance.

The Sezioni Unite recall that the equal treatment of father and mother, established by the Constitutional Court through Judgments No. 87/1975 and No. 30/1983, concerns not only the transmission of citizenship at the moment of birth.

That equality also extends to all the legal consequences deriving from any eventual loss of citizenship by the parent.

In this way, the Court consolidates an interpretation fully consistent with the constitutional principle of equality between parents and with the evolution of Italian family law, excluding any difference in treatment based upon the paternal or maternal line.

An Indirect Message to the Tajani Law?

It is at this point that the judgment acquires a much broader dimension than the specific case before it.

The principles reaffirmed by the Sezioni Unite already constitute, in themselves, a strong indication of the position of the Court of Cassation regarding the foundations upon which the so-called Tajani Law rests.

The judgment reaffirms, in particular, four essential principles:

• citizenship acquired at birth constitutes an original right;
• that status does not automatically disappear as a consequence of subsequent events;
• the loss of citizenship always requires a voluntary, conscious and express decision by the citizen;
• original dual citizenship forms part of the Italian legal tradition.

In this respect, the judgment contains a particularly significant statement.

The Sezioni Unite expressly recall that:

"una doppia cittadinanza originaria era quindi all'inizio del ventesimo secolo una realtà non solo conosciuta, ma anche di stretta ed urgente attualità."

That is to say:

"Original dual citizenship was therefore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a reality that was not only well known, but also one of immediate and pressing importance."

This constitutes an open defence of dual citizenship, severely restricted by the Tajani Law, and a historical reminder that the coexistence of two original citizenships does not constitute an anomaly within the Italian legal system, but rather a reality that has long been recognised and legally accepted for more than a century.

Formally, the Sezioni Unite were not called upon to rule on the constitutionality of the Tajani Law.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to ignore the profound legal tension that emerges between the principles affirmed in this judgment and the legal framework introduced by that law.

Through Article 3-bis, the Tajani Law is based upon a very specific legal construction: certain descendants born abroad must be regarded as though they had never acquired Italian citizenship.

Subsequently, the Constitutional Court, in Judgment No. 63/2026, characterised that mechanism as a "preclusione originaria all'acquisto", that is, an original impediment to the acquisition of citizenship rather than a subsequent loss of citizenship.

The Sezioni Unite, however, now reaffirm precisely the opposite principle.

The Principle That Could Change Everything

The central part of Judgment No. 24045 contains what is probably one of the judgment's most powerful statements.

The Court states:

"...citizenship by virtue of birth is acquired originally iure sanguinis, and the status of citizen, once acquired, is permanent in nature, is not subject to prescription, and may be asserted at any time upon the mere proof of the legal facts giving rise to acquisition, constituted by birth to an Italian citizen; a person seeking recognition of citizenship is required to prove only the fact of acquisition and the line of transmission, whereas the opposing party, if it has raised such an objection, bears the burden of proving the existence of any interrupting event."

In other words, for the Sezioni Unite, citizenship does not come into existence through administrative recognition, but through birth itself whenever the requirements established by law are satisfied.

Judicial or administrative recognition does not create citizenship; it merely recognises it.

It merely declares the existence of a right that came into being from the very moment of birth.

This proposition, long recognised by Italian legal scholarship and case law, constitutes the core of the judgment in its relationship with the Tajani Law and with the Constitutional Court's interpretation.

It is precisely this principle that comes into evident conceptual tension with a legislative construction that considers certain persons never to have acquired a citizenship which, according to the Italian legal tradition reaffirmed by the Sezioni Unite, came into existence with their birth.

A Historical Conception of Ius Sanguinis

Beyond resolving the so-called Minor Issue, Judgment No. 24045 offers an extraordinarily solid historical reconstruction of the Italian system of citizenship.

The Sezioni Unite recall that there exists a continuous legislative development linking the Civil Code of 1865, Law No. 555 of 1912, and Law No. 91 of 1992.

Throughout that legislative evolution, one principle has remained unchanged: citizenship acquired by birth constitutes an original right, permanent in nature, not subject to prescription, and fully justiciable.

It is therefore not a benefit conferred by the Administration, nor a legal status conditional upon subsequent recognition by the State.

It is a legal status that comes into existence with the individual whenever the requirements established by law are fulfilled.

Precisely for that reason, it may cease to exist only in the cases expressly provided for by the legal system, never through extensive interpretations or subsequent legal constructions that retroactively alter a right that has already been acquired.

A Warning Also for the Constitutional Court?

The temporal coincidence is particularly significant.

The Constitutional Court initially held that the legal framework of the Tajani Law was compatible with the Constitution in Judgment No. 63/2026.

However, only a few days before the publication of Judgment No. 24045, the Constitutional Court itself decided to refer a preliminary question concerning Article 3-bis of the Tajani Law to the Court of Justice of the European Union, thereby acknowledging, whether voluntarily or not, that certain aspects of the new legislation raise doubts whose compatibility with European Union law requires prior examination.

That institutional development gives the decision of the Sezioni Unite a significance that extends well beyond the resolution of the specific case.

Formally, the Court of Cassation does not challenge the decision of the Constitutional Court.

Nor could it.

But, by reaffirming the historical principles that have characterised Italian citizenship law since the nineteenth century, it recalls the foundations upon which the Italian legal system has traditionally been built in this field.

From this perspective, Judgment No. 24045 inevitably acquires institutional significance.

Much More Than a Judgment

Judgment No. 24045 not only brings to an end one of the most important interpretative debates concerning Article 7 of Law No. 555 of 1912 and the so-called Minor Issue.

It also restores Italian citizenship law to its historical foundations.

Citizenship is an original legal status, protected by the Italian legislative tradition, by case law, and by principles that have remained substantially unchanged for more than a century.

For that reason, Judgment No. 24045 will be remembered not only for having brought the so-called "Minor Issue" to an end, but also for having reaffirmed a principle that has, for generations, constituted one of the cornerstones of Italian citizenship law:

Citizenship lawfully acquired at birth belongs to the individual from that very moment and may be lost only through the individual's own free, conscious and voluntary decision, and never as the automatic consequence of a subsequent legislative construction seeking to deny a citizenship which, according to the Italian legal tradition came into existence with the person at birth.

Pablo Munini