Mantua Case before the Constitutional Court: Italian Citizenship, Decree-Law and Retroactivity Under Constitutional Review – June 9, 2026 Hearing

The hearing in the so-called Mantua Case has been officially scheduled for June 9, 2026 before the Constitutional Court, marking one of the most significant chapters in the current constitutional litigation concerning Italian citizenship.

Initially, the matter was expected to be heard on March 11 jointly with the referral from the Turin Tribunal. However, such procedural consolidation did not occur. This circumstance is not merely chronological but systemic in nature: by the newly scheduled date, a prior ruling of the Court should already exist regarding the first constitutional challenge to the so-called “Tajani Law.” This will inevitably provide a pre-existing interpretative framework that may shape the analysis of the Mantua case.

Attorney María Stella La Malfa, representing the petitioners in this second constitutional proceeding, has emphasized a fundamental distinction between the Turin and Mantua cases. While both share a common core — the amendment introduced by Article 3 bis and its projected retroactive application — the Mantua case advances a considerably broader constitutional ambition.

Whereas the Turin case focuses on a specific dimension of the reform, Mantua invokes a more extensive array of allegedly violated constitutional parameters. It does not merely challenge the effects of retroactivity, but seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality of the decree in its entirety, affecting individuals born both before and after the legislative reform.

The central argument therefore extends beyond the temporal dimension of the rule and addresses the structural legitimacy of the legislative instrument employed: a decree-law adopted under the alleged grounds of “extraordinary necessity and urgency” by the Meloni Government to introduce a substantial reform in the field of citizenship.

The referral order issued by the Campobasso Tribunal (February 5) further deepens this approach, placing the debate within a procedural-constitutional framework. From this perspective, citizenship cannot be understood as a mere individual legal status, but rather as a constitutive element of the State and an indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of political rights, particularly the right to vote.

If citizenship constitutes the foundation of membership within the political community, a retroactive reform excluding individuals previously entitled does not merely affect individual legal positions; it indirectly alters the composition of the electorate. What is at stake is not only subjective rights, but the very configuration of the demos.

It has been categorically stated:

“A change of such magnitude cannot be adopted through an exceptional instrument such as a decree-law, but requires the ordinary parliamentary legislative procedure.”

The Campobasso Tribunal further maintains that the constitutional requirements of extraordinary necessity and urgency were not met. The phenomena invoked by the Executive have been known for decades and do not constitute an unforeseeable emergency justifying the use of an exceptional normative instrument designed for immediate contingencies, rather than for structurally redesigning the system of Italian citizenship.

From a procedural-constitutional standpoint, the debate assumes particularly complex contours. The Court is bound to rule exclusively within the scope of the issues and constitutional parameters defined by the referring judge (giudice a quo), in accordance with the principle of correspondence between the request and the ruling. In other words, it must decide “within the limits of the challenge.”

Law 87/1953 excludes from constitutional review any political evaluations and any control over the discretionary powers of Parliament (Art. 28), thereby affirming the principle of separation of powers within constitutional adjudication. The Court may not substitute its own political-legislative assessment for that of the legislature.

Likewise, the Court may not alter the subject matter of the proceedings nor introduce entirely new issues, in deference to the incidental nature of constitutional review. Nevertheless, the legal framework provides a significant exception: Article 27, last paragraph, of Law 87/1953 allows the Court to declare unconstitutional other provisions whose invalidity derives as a necessary consequence of its ruling — the doctrine of consequential unconstitutionality.

Within this framework, the central question emerges:

Will the Constitutional Court consider the alleged structural defect — namely, the use of a decree-law and the potential absence of the constitutional prerequisites of necessity and urgency — to be inseparable from the very validity of the contested norm?

Or will it regard such an assessment as falling within the sphere of political discretion, thus remaining beyond substantive constitutional scrutiny in this context?

What is at stake goes beyond the issue of retroactivity. It concerns the broader normative architecture underpinning the reform and the ideological foundation of the so-called “genuine link” with Italy.

June 9, 2026 may therefore represent not merely another procedural milestone, but a potential turning point in the relationship between Italian citizenship, legislative power, and constitutional review.

The debate will undoubtedly be technical.

But its implications will be profoundly institutional.

Pablo Munini